

BHĀMAHA'S «THREEFOLD» ŚLIṢṬĀLAMKĀRA

On commenting upon Udbhaṭa's presentation of a group of *alaṃkāras* at the beginning of *Kāvyaṃkārasārasaṃgraha*, IV *varga*¹, Pratihārendurāja polemically hints at divergent traditions concerning the classification of the figure *śliṣṭa*. He stresses that Udbhaṭa's (otherwise unnecessary, at that stage) mention of *śliṣṭā-ṃkāra* being twofold (*dvidhodāttam tathā śliṣṭam*) aims at rejecting a mistaken opinion on the matter:

«The purport of *tathā* is: *śliṣṭa* is twofold just like *udātta*. And such twofoldness of *śliṣṭa* is mentioned in order to refute divergent opinions. In fact, Bhāmaha says that [*śliṣṭa*] is threefold: *tatsahoktyupamāhetunirdeśāt tri-vidham yathā*»².

1. Udbhaṭa, KASS, IV.1: *preyorasavadūrjasvi paryāyoktam samāhitam / dvidhodāttam tathā śliṣṭam alaṃkāraṇ pare viduḥ*. — From now on, the following abbreviations will be adopted in this paper: KA = Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaṃkāra*; KĀd = Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaḍarśa*; KASS = Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyaṃkārasārasaṃgraha*; RKA = Rudraṭa, *Kāvyaṃkāra*.

2. Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti* ad KASS, IV.1: *tathā udāttavad dvividham śliṣṭam ityarthah / vipratipattinirāsārtham cātra śliṣṭasya dvaividyam uktam / bhāmaho hi — tatsahoktyupamāhetunirdeśāt trividham yathā / iti śliṣṭasya traividhyam āha / ato vipratipattinirāsāya tathetyuktam* (Udbhaṭa, KASS, with *Laghuvṛtti* of Indurāja, ed. with Notes by NARAYANA DASO BANHATTI, Bombay 1925). More concise, but to the same effect, is Tilaka's *Vivṛti* commentary on the same passage of KASS (Udbhaṭa, KASS, with *Vivṛti*, ed. K.S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI SIROMANI, Baroda 1931): *udāttasya dvaividhyakathanam udāharaṇārtham / śliṣṭasya tu vipratipattinirāsāya / tasya hi bhāmahena traividhyam uktam*. — The oldest printed edd. of KA (ed. K.P. TRIVEDI, as Appendix to *The Pratiṣāraṇaśobhāṣaṇa* of Vidyānātha, Bombay 1909; edd. B.N. SARMA and BALDEVA UPADHYAYA, Benares 1928) have *kramaśo* instead of *trividham*; Indurāja's quotation seems to be decisive (though it may also be supposed to have been — purposefully or otherwise — the source of the *varia*

The refuted opinion is therefore Bhāmaha's: the words quoted by Indurāja actually occur in KA, III.17 cd. No more does Indurāja say about the controversy.

Nor do modern commentators go further. The *vipratipatti* concerning the number of *śliṣṭa*'s «varieties» may indeed seem to be relatively unimportant, and to involve (as so many other controversies) just the Indian love for minute classifications, taxonomies, and mnemonics.

Still, there is something strange in this controversy. Udbhaṭa's twofold classification of *śliṣṭa*, which is said to diverge from Bhāmaha's *in the number of its elements*, is actually *inconsistent* with Bhāmaha's threefold one: it is based on totally different criteria. Udbhaṭa classifies *śliṣṭa* into *śabda*² and *arthaśliṣṭa*, whereas Bhāmaha's varieties are named *sahokti*, *upamā*, and *hetu*, as is stressed by Indurāja's very quotation³. The two terminologies, in other words, are not comparable to each other. Which means that the question does not rest simply on numbers. It must involve something more substantial.

Moreover, the terminology introduced by Bhāmaha in naming the varieties of *śliṣṭa* is adopted by no other Sanskrit theorist we know of; nor do Udbhaṭa, or Indurāja (or any other among the ancients, to my knowledge) tell us what exactly do *sahokti*, *upamā*, and *hetu* mean in Bhāmaha's analysis of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra*.

Modern commentators generally interpret the terms *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* as referring to the *alaṃkāras* bearing the same names⁴. In a word, Bhāmaha would be alluding to the association of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* with other *alaṃkāras*: an idea which is in fact central in most of the later theories on *śleṣa* — an idea, indeed,

lectio). In any case, Bhāmaha states that *śliṣṭa* is threefold also in KA, III.1: *preyora-savadūrjasvi paryāyoktaṃ samāhūtaṃ / dviprakāraṃ udāttaṃ ca bhedaḥ śliṣṭam api tribhiḥ*. See following note.

3. In fact, Indurāja could have quoted KA, III.1 (see preceding note), which is more directly paralleled by KASS, IV.1. His choice is therefore deeply significant — the more so, if we would suppose that his quotation is actually incorrect.

4. S.K. DE, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta 1960², vol. 2, p. 56; G. JENNER, *Die Poetischen Figuren der Inder von Bhāmaha bis Mammaṭa*, Hamburg 1968, pp. 147-148, 154-155; E. GEROW, *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech*, The Hague-Paris 1971, pp. 292, 306.

which has been the focus of all the ample and extremely subtle discussions upon the nature of this figure of speech, precisely from Udbhaṭa's times onward.

But then, how could Udbhaṭa criticize Bhāmaha for using as a classifying criterion a notion which he himself accepted and propounded? It may be argued that the 'associative' nature of *śliṣṭa* is, nevertheless, *not* the ground for Udbhaṭa's classification of this *alaṃkāra* — it is introduced by him as a *lakṣaṇa* of *śliṣṭa*, therefore transcending *bhedas*⁵. But if Udbhaṭa believed that Bhāmaha somehow endorsed his own point of view («other *alaṃkāras* necessarily accompany *śliṣṭa*»), he would have maybe enlarged Bhāmaha's enumeration, instead of rejecting it as too wide⁶. Or, better still, he would have criticized Bhāmaha's classification on the grounds of quality (why precisely *those* specific *alaṃkāras*, and only those?), not of quantity (two instead of three). Udbhaṭa's criticism must therefore concern Bhāmaha's *criteria* of classification: this implies that, at least in Udbhaṭa's opinion, Bhāmaha ignored precisely the 'associative' nature of *śliṣṭa*. Which is, in fact, not otherwise mentioned in the *KA*. In a word: *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* cannot be *alaṃkāras* in *KA*, III.17.

Indeed, I am stating nothing new. There are, actually, a few modern commentaries which do not explain *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* in *KA*, III.17 as *alaṃkāras*. I am alluding to D.T. TATACHARYA SIROMANI's *Udyānavṛtti* on *KA* (published in 1934), and to the English commentary on *KA* by C. SANKARA RAMA SASTRI (published in 1956)⁷. According to this alternative in-

5. KASS, IV.9-10 (ed. N.D. BANHATTI): *ekaprayatnoccāryāṇāṃ tacchāyāṃ caiva bibhratām / svaritādiguṇair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam ihocyate // alaṃkāraṇtaragatāṃ pratibhāṃ janayat padaiḥ / dvividhair arthaśabdoktiviśiṣṭaṃ tat pratiyātām*. As to the exact purport of the notion of *pratibhā* in Udbhaṭa's outlook, this is another, very old, and very thorny, problem, which I cannot discuss here. It seems to me that, in any case, Udbhaṭa was the first one to explicitly connect *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* with some sort of a necessary 'association' to another *alaṃkāra*: as to the nature of such an association, it is irrelevant to the point I'm raising in this paper.

6. He gives, indeed, precisely *three* examples of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra*, which, according to his commentators, correspond to three different instances (*upamā*, *rūpaka*, *virodha*) of *alaṃkāraṇtarapratibhā*.

7. Bhāmaha, *KA*, with *Udyāna Vṛtti*, English and Sanskrit Introduction, Index, and an Appendix dealing with *Ālaṃkārikas* by D.T. TATACHARYA SIROMANI,

terpretation, *sahokti* is, in KA, III.17, the same as *samuccaya* or syntactical coordination (*cakāravat*, in the *Udyānavṛtti*'s words); *upamā* is, in general, «comparison» (*upamānvācakaśabdavat*), and *hetu* is syntactical causality, i.e. the use of an ablative (*hetuvācakaapañcamīyukta*). This interpretation is perfectly consistent both with Bhāmaha's text (or context) and with his three *udāharaṇas*, exemplifying the three announced varieties of *śliṣṭa*.

As regards the text, it may in fact not be easy to understand why should Bhāmaha have connected *śliṣṭa* with such an odd triad of *alaṃkāras* as *sahokti*, *upamā*, *hetu*. The commonest and fundamental figure of speech, *upamā* (occupying, by the way, only the second place in the list), would be assigned a role similar to that of two definitely minor figures, *sahokti* and *hetu*. To the latter, moreover, Bhāmaha has previously denied a position among *alaṃkāras*⁸. And nowhere else in Sanskrit poetics *śliṣṭa* is explicitly associated with *sahokti* or *hetu*: though, as we know, later theorists (and, in a more general way, even Daṇḍin) tend to assign the widest scope possible to the 'associative' nature of *śliṣṭa*.

Similar conclusions may be got at by examining Bhāmaha's *udāharaṇas* for *śliṣṭa*⁹. In the first example the *upamāna* and the *upameya*, whose similarity is justified by common (homonymic) attributes, are indeed connected through coordination (*ca*); in the

Tiruvadi 1934; KA of Bhāmaha, with English Translation and Notes on Paricchedas 1 to 3 by C. SANKARA RAMA SASTRI, Mylapore 1956. Another attempt to see *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* as not denoting *alaṃkāras* is to be found in KA of Bhāmaha, ed. with English Translation and Notes by P.V. NAGANATHA SASTRY, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1970² (1st ed. 1927); it is, nevertheless, less convincing: «the simultaneous statement in that (*tat* = *Rūpaka*) is caused by the existence of resemblance. The three kinds are as follows» (transl. of KA, III.17 cd, *op. cit.*, p. 60). BISWANATH BHATTACHARYA, *Identification of two Citations in Udbhata's Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa Fragments*, in «Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha», vol. 27, 1-2, pp. 43-45, also connects *sahokti* with *cakāra*; but at the same time he defines as «the standpoint of Bhāmaha» terms as *śabdaśliṣṭa*, *arthaśliṣṭa*, *rūpaka-pratibhotpatti*hetu, etc., which are actually unknown to the KA.

8. KA, II.86: *hetuś ca sūkṣmo leśo 'tha nālaṃkāratayā mataḥ / samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ*.

9. KA, III.18-20: *chāyāvanto gatavyālāḥ svārohaḥ phaladāyinaḥ / mārga-drumā mahāntaś ca pareṣām eva bhūtaye // unnatā lokadāyitā mahāntaḥ prājyavar-ṣiṇaḥ / śamayanti kṣites tāpaṃ surājāno ghanā iva // ratnavattvād agādhatvāt svamaryādāvilāṅghanāt / bahusattvāśrayatvācca sadṛśas tvam udanvatā*.

second example, the same effect is got at through *iva*, stating a comparison; in the third one, the common and homonymic attributes themselves are introduced as ablatives: the similarity between *upamāna* and *upameya*, stated this time through the attribute *sadr̥śa* (which excludes having both terms of comparison in the nominative case, with attributes ἀπὸ κοινοῦ), is therefore justified through syntactical causality. On the other hand, the assumed *sahoktyalaṃkāra* in the first example does not correspond to Bhāmaha's definition (and *udāharaṇa*) of the figure *sahokti*¹⁰: no adverb *saha* is present (as in the example in KA, III.40), and there are no two simultaneous actions (as required by the definition in KA, III.39: *tulyakāle kriye*); the similarity, in Bhāmaha's first example of *śliṣṭa*, rests on *guṇas*, not on *kriyās*. Such difficulties (or some of them) have, by the way, been noticed by G. JENNER and E. GEROW¹¹, who nevertheless do not raise doubts about *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* being *alaṃkāras* in KA, III.17.

It may seem, at this point, that I am insisting too much on no problem at all. As I said, the one which I believe to be the only possible consistent interpretation of *sahoktyupamāhetu* in KA, III.17 has already been stated (more than fifty years ago!): it is no discovery of my own. But what I would like to stress here is the fact that the other, inconsistent, interpretation still appears to co-exist with it. More precisely, the two interpretations are never confronted with each other; they seem, instead, to ignore each other¹². And the fact remains that the major studies on Sanskrit poetics, including those published or republished quite recently (in the

10. KA, III.39-40: *tulyakāle kriye yatra vastudvayasamāśraye / padenaikena kathyete sahoktiḥ sā matā yathā // himapātāviladiṣo gāḍhālīṅganahetavaḥ / vṛddhim āyanti yāmīnyāḥ kāmīnāṃ prītibhiḥ saha*.

11. G. JENNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155; E. GEROW, *loc. cit.* — Maybe *nirdeśāt* in KA, III.17 points precisely to the more generally syntactic, and not specifically 'figural', value of the terms *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu*?

12. S.K. DE, *op. cit.* (second, revised, ed.), vol. 1, p. 57, does not include Tatacharya's ed. in his bibliography on Bhāmaha; nor does G. JENNER, *op. cit.*. On the other hand, Tatacharya's ed. is actually mentioned in E. GEROW's bibliography (*op. cit.*), but is apparently taken no advantage of in this connection. — One would say that the fate which occurred to Bhāmaha's treatise itself (rejected, maybe misunderstood, finally lost, and rediscovered, with no ancient commentary, only at the beginning of our century) is still lingering upon its modern commentaries.

sixties and seventies), either quote as unproblematic Bhāmaha's three '*alaṃkāras*' associated with *śliṣṭa*¹³, or hopelessly remark his inconsistencies in his analysis of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra*¹⁴. And no scholar at all, to my knowledge, quotes the sources or motivations of his own interpretation, which is in all cases taken for granted.

Finally, but most important, no one, as far as I know, has hitherto investigated upon the implications of the interpretation I am here supporting, which assigns to Bhāmaha what I would call, for brevity, the 'non-associative' analysis of *śliṣṭa*. And precisely on such implications I intend to dwell briefly.

The first one may concern the relationship of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* to *upamālaṃkāra*. If, it may be argued, Bhāmaha ignores the notion of an association between *śliṣṭa* and other *alaṃkāras*, *upamālaṃkāra* is nevertheless actually present in his second example of *śliṣṭa*, where it is borne out by the 'indicator' *iva*. But the problem lies in bringing into light Bhāmaha's opinion, not in analysing the example as such; and, on the grounds of Bhāmaha's own definition of *śliṣṭa*, we must assume that what Bhāmaha sees in his second example of *śliṣṭa* is a «comparison», but *not* an *alaṃkāra* (other than *śliṣṭa*). *Iva* defines a «variety» of *śliṣṭa*: it is irrelevant, in this context, that it defines, or may also define, another *alaṃkāra*.

In fact, Bhāmaha's overall definition of *śliṣṭa* points, from its very outset (KA, III.14), to the establishment of an identification between «terms of comparison» (*upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate*)¹⁵. That is to say, *śliṣṭa* always implies, according to

13. S.K. DE, *loc. cit. supra*, note 4.

14. G. JENNER, E. GEROW, *loc. cit. supra*, note 11 (and note 4).

15. KA, III.14: *upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate / guṇakriyābhyāṃ nāmnā ca śliṣṭaṃ tad abhidhiyate*. This is the reason why, in analysing his examples, I have above spoken of *upamānas* and *upameyas*. — One other problem has been thought to lie in Bhāmaha's mention of *guṇa*, *kriyā* and *nāman* in KA, III.14: E. GEROW, *op. cit.*, p. 292, considers this to be a second triad of «varieties» of *śliṣṭa*. But KA, III.14 states the *lakṣaṇa*, not the *bhedas*, of *śliṣṭa*: I believe this triad merely states the formal-grammatical possibilities of double sense. It is, nevertheless, true that *nāman* seems not to be exemplified in the *udāharaṇas*: but, if *nāman* is not a *bheda*, this cannot be considered to be a major fallacy in Bhāmaha's analysis of *śliṣṭa*. Certainly there is no connection between *guṇa-kriyā-nāman* and *sahokti-upamā-hetu*: this is, in my opinion, fundamental.

Bhāmaha, a comparison relationship; which does not entail an actual 'association' with *upamā*, or with other *alaṃkāras*. Otherwise, *upamālaṃkāra* would be a *lakṣaṇa* of *śliṣṭa*, whereas Bhāmaha states that *upamā* is no more than a *bheda* of *śliṣṭa*. Such an outlook is not at all exceptional. So many other figures of speech involve a comparison, and this causes no controversy among the theorists.

In a word, the core of Bhāmaha's point of view on *śliṣṭa* is stated precisely at the beginning of his definition: *śliṣṭa* implies *aupamya*. Bhāmaha is the only Sanskrit theorist to explicitly assign *śliṣṭa* such a position among *alaṃkāras*¹⁶; and we may remark that comparison, being *śliṣṭa*'s *lakṣaṇa*, is also the ground for *śliṣṭa*'s very *alaṃkāratā*. Hence also, Bhāmaha's care in stressing the difference between *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka* (another figure of «shortened comparison»): a difference to which he significantly devotes two *śloka*s and a half (KA, III.15-17 ab)¹⁷. No wonder he is the only one to mention this problem: it is central to him, and to him alone, precisely because he alone sees *śliṣṭa* as a figure of (implied) comparison¹⁸.

16. Of course, I do not take into account Vāmana's classification of figures, according to which *all alaṃkāras* involve a similitude.

17. After which he proceeds to his concise statement about *śliṣṭa*'s *traividhya*. This is the full text of KA, III.15-17: *lakṣaṇam rūpake 'pidaṃ lakṣyate kāmam atra tu / iṣṭaḥ prayogo yugapad upamānopameyayoh // śikarāmbhomadasrjas tuṅgā jalada-dāntinaḥ / ityatra meghakariṇām nirdeśaḥ kriyate samam // śleṣād evārthavacasor asya ca kriyate bhidā / tat saḥoktyupamāhetunirdeśāt trividham yathā*. — It is clearly incorrect to say that Bhāmaha considers *śliṣṭa* as «a variety of metaphor (*rūpaka*)» (E. GEROW, *op. cit.*, p. 292; cfr. *ibid.*, p. 291). Moreover, it must be borne in mind that *rūpaka*, though based on syntactic devices which may recall our «metaphor», cannot be identified with metaphor as such, as it is a «figure» (*alaṃkāra*), and not a «trope» (*lakṣaṇā*): G. JENNER, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka. I principi dello dhvani*, a c. di V. MAZZARINO, Torino 1983, p. 257.

18. By the way, Bhāmaha's criterion for differentiation between *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka* is also theoretically most significant: it opposes simultaneous utterance (*yugapad prayoga*: see preceding note) to parallel utterance (*samam*). The two main modes of «shortened comparison», the «metaphorical» one on the one hand (which has had a central importance in the history of Western poetics), and homonymy on the other (which has been, instead, much loved by Sanskrit theorists and poets), are thereby clearly set into light. — *Yaugapadya* defines homonymy in Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadiya*, II.462, 472, and elsewhere. Our own Western tradition was not at all times aware of the differences between homonymy and metaphor:

Bhāmaha's three «varieties» of *śliṣṭa* are therefore the three main modes of expression which are capable of bearing out, or of 'indicating'¹⁹, a comparison implied by a poetic homonymy. In this light, Bhāmaha's definition turns out to be deeply coherent. And, I would add, strictly 'formal'. Bhāmaha's interest lies mainly in the *forms* of expression connected with a homonymic turn of speech. Such forms of expression are conceived of as 'indicators' of *śliṣṭa*: they have a syntactical, not an *alaṃkāric* (or «figural») status.

Here lies, then, the point of Udbhaṭa's criticism to Bhāmaha. Udbhaṭa's starting-point in defining *śliṣṭa* is no more situated on the figural-(rhetorical) level (comparison, as in Bhāmaha): it is purely linguistic. *Śliṣṭālaṃkāra* is, in other terms, defined by Udbhaṭa as a linguistic phenomenon (or, if we prefer, a linguistic anomaly): two meanings are related to one and the same sound (as Udbhaṭa puts it, to two 'coalescing' sounds)²⁰. Udbhaṭa's interest as a poetician is no more devoted to style alone, but to what precedes and motivates form or style: the relationship between the word and its object (or objects). This is also reflected in Udbhaṭa's very terminology. It is certainly not necessary to recall here the history of terms like *śabdaśleṣa* and *arthaśleṣa*²¹: it will be sufficient to remark that it is, in fact, the history of the progressive limitation of *śliṣṭa*'s very right to have an independent position among *alaṃkāras*. In a word, the modes of expression which were, in Bhāmaha's analysis, only «varieties» of the «figure» of homonymy have, in time, swallowed it up: they have taken up the main 'poetical' role, while homonymy was reduced to a fundamentally linguistic phenomenon.

e.g., Aristotle defines as «homonyms» terms like «pleasure», «love», «good», which can be used «in more than one sense»: Arist., *Topica*, I.15.

19. The presence of a 'formal' detector (in our case, *ca*, or *iva*, or the ablative case) is probably considered to be necessary, as in common speech we tend to disambiguate homonyms (cfr. again Bhartr̥hari, *Vākyapadīya*, II.314 ff.). Poetry violates the 'normal' laws of signification and comprehension, and stylistic devices are after all no more than the 'signals' of such a violation.

20. See *supra*, note 5.

21. See E. GEROW, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-294, 306; and especially the ample and detailed discussion in M.-C. PORCHER, *Figures de style en sanskrit*, Paris 1978, pp. 341 ff.

What has determined such a major change? Unluckily, what is left of Udbhaṭa's *Bhāmahavivaraṇa*²² is too fragmentary to be of any help to us in this connection. It would be much too simplifying, though, to state that Bhāmaha's point of view is less refined, or less theoretically aware, than that of the later theorists. His system shows, as I said, a pretty strong internal consistency, which appears to be quite adequate to its own purposes. Certainly Bhāmaha's examples of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* are structurally and stylistically 'easier' than those of later theorists. Indeed, I would connect the later dismissal of his theory on *śliṣṭa* to a less abstract change: a change (a development) in literary production and literary taste.

Homonymy is a good detector for poetic taste. A wider use of homonymy in poetry involves, much more than other literary techniques, a deeper skill, both active and passive, in handling the tools of linguistic signification — in other terms, it involves an increased interest in linguistic theory rather than in pure stylistics. The more so, when it concerns a language as strictly regulated and conventionalized both on the grammatical and on the literary level, as is the case, indeed, for Sanskrit. To sum up: Bhāmaha's definitions are 'formal' (and the term should be no pejorative) because Bhāmaha's object of study is style; in Udbhaṭa's times, linguistic theory has widely crept into *alaṃkāraśāstra*, and into the very 'making' of poetry. Thus a stylistic device, as *śliṣṭa* was in Bhāmaha's perspective, can be said, in another perspective, to pertain to *śabda* or to *artha*. Of course, such an integration of linguistics to poetics is precisely what made possible, at its climax, the birth and the diffusion of the *dhvani* theory, which is a major attainment in Sanskrit *alaṃkāraśāstra* (and in literary thought in general). But such an integration, especially at such levels, is not necessary to poetics as long as poetic style does not require it. Bhāmaha's examples do not require a full analysis of the semantic possibilities offered by homonymy: they can be analysed as mere stylistic devices, just like any other «ornament» (*alaṃkāra*: once again, the term should not be meant as a pejorative).

22. R. GNOLI, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyaṃkāra of Bhāmaha*, Roma 1962: the fragments relating to *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* are nos. 39a and 39b.

For instance, they do not envisage homophony (or imperfect homonymy). Homophony appears in Daṇḍin's *KĀd*, bearing a somewhat 'mechanical' denomination (which refers to the «splitting up» of words)²³. Then, it appears in Udbhaṭa's *KASS*: this time, with direct reference to *śabda* and *artha* — that is to say, to semantics, rather than to stylistics. We may suppose that the spreading use of homophonies in literature (including such bewildering instances as *dvisandhānakāvyas*²⁴) called for new theories, aimed both at justifying the newer literary techniques and at differentiating them in terms of poetic 'values'.

Thus, if the 'mature', and better known, history of *śliṣṭa* in Sanskrit *alaṃkāraśāstra* begins with the notion of an association of other *alaṃkāras* to *śliṣṭa*, such a notion appears to be no more than the necessary consequence of the introduction of linguistic criteria (relationship between *śabdā* and *artha*) in the definition of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* itself. As such, the very same notion of a possible association between *śliṣṭa* and other *alaṃkāras* is by no means unknown to Bhāmaha. It appears in *samsrṣṭyalaṃkāra*²⁵ (and the example in KA, III.50 does actually involve *śliṣṭa* together with *vyatireka*); and it also appears in *utprekṣā-vayavālaṃkāra*²⁶, which is said to be *śliṣṭasyārthena saṃyuktaḥ* (KA, III.47). But there is no need, in Bhāmaha's system, for introducing such a notion in the definition of *śliṣṭa*: the function of *śliṣṭa* as an *alaṃkāra* lies precisely in its necessarily implying a comparison

23. *KĀd*, II.310: *śliṣṭam iṣṭam anekārtham ekarūpānvitam vacaḥ / tad abhin-
napadam bhinnapadaprāyam itī dvidhā*.

24. Most *dvisandhānakāvyas* we know of seem to be much later; we may suppose that they started spreading in the lapse of time between Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa. A *dvisandhānakāvya* is said to have been composed by one Daṇḍin, who is uncertainly identified with the author of *KĀd*: V. RAGHAVAN, *Bhoja's Śrīngāraprakāśa*, Madras 1963, pp. 837 ff.; D.K. GUPTA, *A critical study of Daṇḍin and his works*, Delhi 1970, p. 59; A.K. WARDER, *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. IV, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1983, p. 166.

25. KA, III.49-50: *varā vibhūṣā samsrṣṭir bahvalaṃkārayogataḥ / racitā ratna-
māleḥ sā caivam uditā yathā // gāmbhīryalāvaṇyavator yuvayoh prājyaratnayoh /
sukhasevyo janānām tvaṃ duṣṭagrāho 'mbhasām patih*.

26. KA, III.47-48: *śliṣṭasyārthena saṃyuktaḥ kimcid utprekṣāyānvitaḥ / rūpa-
kārthena ca punar utprekṣāvayavo yathā // tulyodayāvāsānatvād gate 'staṃ prati
bhāsvati / vāsāya vāsaraḥ klānto viśatīva tamogṛham*. This *alaṃkāra* is ignored by later theorists, with the only exception of Vāmana.

(*upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya*, as we have seen)²⁷. This is enough to guarantee its *alaṃkāratā*, and no worry need arise about anomalous linguistic phenomena, which pertain to different levels of analysis.

Udbhaṭa's *alaṃkārantarapratibhā* is thus functionally necessary to explain that peculiar quality of *śliṣṭa* which Bhāmaha identifies in its capability of stating an *upamānena upameyasya tattvam*. And it is necessary as a *lakṣaṇa*: otherwise, the definition of *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* would be identical to the *linguistic* definition of homonymy/homophony.

To tell the truth, this is exactly what happens in Daṇḍin's *KĀd*, whose only *lakṣaṇa* for *śleṣa* is *iṣṭam anekārtham ekarūpānvitam vacaḥ* (*KĀd*, II.310)²⁸. There is a reason for that: Daṇḍin's second *udāharaṇa*²⁹, which is by the way precisely an example of *bhinna-padaśleṣa*, does not seem to imply any comparison (nor any other connection, logical or 'figural') between its two meanings. In other terms, Daṇḍin's *śliṣṭa* is, from the point of view of its definition, nearest to (linguistic) homonymy/homophony in general, with no added stylistic (or 'poetic') qualifications³⁰.

So, this is a *third* point of view on poetic homonymy: there exists a «pure» *śliṣṭa*, whose two meanings are not connected to each other, either as terms of a comparison, or as elements of another *alaṃkāra*. Such a point of view was also implicitly rejected and corrected by Udbhaṭa, precisely through the notion of *alaṃkārantarapratibhā* as a *lakṣaṇa* of *śliṣṭa*. But it was not lost

27. *KA*, III.14 (see *supra*, note 15).

28. See *supra*, note 23.

29. *KĀd*, III.312: *doṣākareṇa sambadhnannakṣatrapathavaritinaḥ / rājñā pradoṣo mām ittham apriyaṃ kiṃ na bādhathe*. Daṇḍin's first example (which is, by the way, based on a homonymic *nāman* — cfr. above, note 15 —) can, on the contrary, imply a comparison between its two meanings, though, quite differently from Bhāmaha's position, it contains no formal-stylistic 'indicators' of the comparison itself: *asāvudayaṃ ārūḍhaḥ kāntimān raktamaṇḍalaḥ / rājā harati lokasya hṛdayaṃ mṛdubhiḥ karaiḥ* (*KĀd*, III.311).

30. I suppose that what, in Daṇḍin's view, marks the poetic status of *śliṣṭa* (as opposed to the common linguistic use of homonymy) is the fact that the *alaṃkāra*'s double sense (*anekārtham*: see above, note 23) is said to be *intended* by the speaker/writer (*iṣṭam*) — whereas in common speech ambiguities are incidental and need disambiguation.

sight of by later theorists: it reappears, and in more radical terms, in Rudraṭa³¹, in Tilaka³², and in Ānandavardhana himself³³. Actually, the notion of a «pure» *śliṣṭa*, involving no other *alamkāra*, became necessary to those theorists who, opposing Udbhaṭa, considered the *alamkāra* accompanying *śliṣṭa* to be predominant on *śliṣṭa* itself. Which amounts to saying that, to those theorists, Bhāmaha's *śliṣṭa* had already lost any possible signification as an *alamkāra*.

Nevertheless, Daṇḍin also mentions (but not as a *lakṣaṇa*) the peculiar capability of *śliṣṭa* of associating with other *alamkāras*. But he finds no difficulty in defining such manifold instances both as «varieties» of the other *alamkāras* (*śliṣṭarūpaka*, *śliṣṭārthadīpaka*, *śliṣṭākṣepa*, *saśleṣavyatireka*, etc.), and as aspects of *śleṣa* itself (*prāg eva darśitāḥ śleṣāḥ*: KĀd, II.313). In fact, Daṇḍin gives *śleṣa* such a wide scope of action, that it comes again very near to losing its status as a regular *alamkāra* when he states its omnipresence in *all* poetical turns of speech (*vakrokti*: KĀd, II.363)³⁴.

31. Rudraṭa's examples of *śabdaśleṣa* (RKA, IV.1-30) do not involve any comparison; only at a second stage does Rudraṭa state that *śabdaśleṣa* may imply a «touch» of figures of comparison (*upamā* or *samuccaya*; cfr. *infra*, note 40): *bhāṣa-śleṣavihinaḥ sprṣati prāyo 'nyam apy alamkāram / dhatte vaicitryam ayaṁ sutarām upamāsamuccayayoh // sphutam arthālamkārav etāv upamāsamuccayau kim tu / āśritya śabdamaītram sāmānyam ihāpi sambhavataḥ* (RKA, IV.31-32). Rudraṭa doesn't mention a possible association between *arthaśleṣa* and other *alamkāras*, though his ten «pure» (*śuddha*: RKA, X.2) *arthaśleṣas* do imply a connection between their two meanings. His commentator, Namisādhū, is nevertheless more explicit: *arthaśleṣa* can unite with other figures, thus becoming «infinite» (comm. on RKA, X.2).

32. Tilaka, in his *Vivṛti* on Udbhaṭa's *udāharaṇas* for *śliṣṭa* (KASS, IV.25-27, *ed. cit.*, pp. 39 f.), rejects Udbhaṭa's definition, and subsumes *śliṣṭa* under *upamā*; elsewhere (*Vivṛti* ad KASS, V.24, *ed. cit.*, p. 47) he quotes an instance of «pure» *śleṣa* (the anonymous stanza *yena dhvastamanobhavana...*), as evidently inconsistent with Udbhaṭa's point of view (but not with his own).

33. Ānandavardhana quotes the same stanza *yena dhvasta...* (see preceding note) as an instance of *śleṣālamkāra*, differentiating it both from the explicit association of *śleṣa* with another *alamkāra* (in Udbhaṭa's sense) and from *śabdaśaktimūladhvani* (*Dhvanyāloka*, II.21, *vṛtti*). His position is quite excentric, in that he accepts both Udbhaṭa's point of view and that of «pure» *śleṣa*: he can do so, as his criteria are thoroughly original, and take into account both the existence of a connection (or of no connection) between the two meanings of a homonymic utterance, and the *vācyatā/vyaṅgyatā* of such a connection.

34. Though this paper is concerned with what I call the 'evolution' of the

To sum up, we come across three different definitions of (or «points of view» on) *śliṣṭālaṃkāra* in the earlier³⁵ history of Sanskrit poetics. According to the first one, *śliṣṭa* is a figure involving comparison (like *rūpaka*, but radically different from *rūpaka* in that it uses homonymy); its «varieties» are modes of expression, syntactic devices indicating and motivating such comparison. From the second point of view, *śliṣṭa* is, most generally, identical to homonymy and homophony, provided that the two meanings are both intended, even when unrelated to each other. It can also associate with other *alaṃkāras* and, in general again, be present in any *vakrokti*; though it is classified as an *alaṃkāra*, no need is felt, in such cases, to state some sort of hierarchy between *śleṣa* and the accompanying figure. Thirdly, *śliṣṭa* is conceived of as homonymy or homophony, but necessarily associated with another *alaṃkāra*, whose presence is defined as a *pratibhā*.

Now, only in the first definition examined is *śliṣṭa*'s *alaṃkāratā* formally undisputable; and precisely the first definition (Bhāmaha's) has been completely dismissed by the later theorists (and misunderstood in our own times).

Marie-Claude Porcher has remarked that *śliṣṭa* is «à la fois intérieur et extérieur à la classification des figures», and «bien évidemment, autre chose qu'une figure»³⁶; nevertheless, I would not be quite sure that Bhāmaha was, from an absolute point of view (if, indeed, such a point of view does exist), wrong. On the contrary, I would say Bhāmaha teaches us that it is possible, after all, to envisage *śliṣṭa* as an *alaṃkāra* in the fullest sense. But an *alaṃkāra* is part of a system, and the system works as a whole. My suggestion is that the refinement of style in Sanskrit literature had the effect of multiplying *śleṣas* in practice and in theory: Rudraṭa's case is emblematic. At the same time, new criteria for 'poetry' were looked for, and homonymic polysemy was multiplied further.

notion of *śliṣṭa*, I shall not make any statement about Daṇḍin's chronology in relation to Bhāmaha. Daṇḍin seems to have in mind a much more refined literary context (and audience) than Bhāmaha; but then, so many other factors must be taken into account (e.g., geographical collocation, audience, purpose of the treatise) that the problem is most likely to remain unsolved.

35. «Earlier», of course, as opposed to «earliest» (i.e., before Bhāmaha).

36. M.-C. PORCHER, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

Stepping over the boundaries of mere *alamkārātā*, it entered the realm of *dhvani*, while *śabdaśleṣa* became no more than verbal play, and what was finally left to *arthaśleṣa* (the 'original' *alamkāra*) was something very near to our metaphor. At the end, double sense is identified with double reference³⁷.

Oddly enough, exactly the opposite direction has been followed by European rhetorics and poetics. Our tradition ignored the 'figural' functions of homonymy for centuries (but for a small, and often disliked, group of «figures of word» — verbal play — and of repetition³⁸). Only at a certain, and very peculiar, stage do we find equivocation defined as a variety of metaphor (EMANUELE TESAURO's «*Metafora di Equivoco*»)³⁹. And *pour cause*: metaphor had by then become the central figure of speech, charged with the major polysemic effects; very much as had happened to *śleṣa* in Sanskrit tradition. In both cases, identification with polysemy in general amounts to virtually losing individuality as a proper figure.

The evolution of *śleṣa* in Sanskrit poetics is therefore not, in my opinion, a direct and necessary consequence of its homonymic-polysemic essence; though it is, of course, connected with the manifold aspects of homonymic signification. But connections between poetics and logic, logic and linguistics, poetics and linguistics, are, indeed, extremely complex, and far from having been thoroughly explored.

Coming back to Bhāmaha, I do not know what is the original source of the interpretation of KA, III.17 which I have mentioned at the outset of this paper, viewing *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu* as *alamkāras*. I suspect it is rooted in the Indian tradition itself,

37. I am alluding to Mammaṭa's point of view, and especially to Jagannātha's, about which see again the exhaustive analysis by M.-C. PORCHER, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-359.

38. *Antanaclasis* especially, with its varieties: see H. LAUSBERG, *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*, München 1967 (1st ed. 1949), § 292. I myself have been examining at greater length the literary use of homonymy in the Indian and Western traditions in my Doctoral Dissertation entitled *Le parole dell'ambiguità: poetiche dell'omonimia* (Roma 1987), to be published in 1991.

39. E. TESAURO, *Cannocchiale Aristotelico*, Venezia 1702 (1st ed. 1655), cap. VII, pp. 222-241.

which for a long time (since Udbhaṭa, or since Udbhaṭa's commentators) has been accustomed to invariably connecting the notion of *śliṣṭa* with that of an associated *alaṃkāra*. If this is the case, I shall briefly add one last remark.

After treating his eight varieties of *śabdaśleṣa*, Rudraṭa introduces a few instances of *śleṣa* accompanied by a «touch» of *upamā* and *samuccaya*⁴⁰. Now, his example of *samuccayaśleṣa* is structurally identical to Bhāmaha's example of *sahoktiśliṣṭa*⁴¹: Rudraṭa's *samuccayālaṃkāra*, quite differently from Bhāmaha's *sahoktyālaṃkāra*, actually implies grammatical coordination. In a word: Rudraṭa's «touch» of *samuccaya* in *śleṣa* combines both the structure of *grammatical samuccaya* (which Bhāmaha calls *sahokti* in *KA*, III.17), and the classification of such structure as an *alaṃkāra*. The 'non-associative' and the 'associative' notion of *śleṣālaṃkāra*, the 'grammatical' and the 'figural' methods of analysis, seem, in this one instance, to converge. Was Rudraṭa aware of it? I will not attempt an answer to this question. But I believe it possible that the misunderstanding of Bhāmaha's three «varieties» of *śliṣṭa* as *alaṃkāras* may have originated, or may have been corroborated, by Rudraṭa's unprecedented *samuccayālaṃkāra*.

40. *RKA*, IV.31: see above, note 31. *Samuccaya*, consisting in a comparison stated through coordination, is an *alaṃkāra* appearing for the first time in Rudraṭa's treatise (*RKA*, VIII.103; a second, different *samuccaya* is defined in *RKA*, VII.19-29). E. GEROW, *op. cit.*, p. 171, is wrong in reading *samuccayopamā* as referring to a single *alaṃkāra*: the compound has a dual ending.

41. *RKA*, IV.34 ab: *vasudhāmāhitasurājītanīrāgamanā bhavāṃśca varṣāśca*. Bhāmaha's *udāharaṇa* containing *sahokti* (*KA*, III.18) is quoted *supra*, note 9. But Rudraṭa's example is based on *sabhaṅgaśleṣa* («homophony»), which, together with the opposition between *śabda* and *arthaśleṣa*, is unknown to Bhāmaha.